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Abstract. The interest in post-quantum cryptography — classical sys-
tems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary — has
generated elegant proposals for new cryptosystems. Some of these sys-
tems are set in the random oracle model and are proven secure relative
to adversaries that have classical access to the random oracle. We argue
that to prove post-quantum security one needs to prove security in the
quantum-accessible random oracle model where the adversary can query
the random oracle with quantum states.
We begin by separating the classical and quantum-accessible random or-
acle models by presenting a scheme that is secure when the adversary
is given classical access to the random oracle, but is insecure when the
adversary can make quantum oracle queries. We then set out to develop
generic conditions under which a classical random oracle proof implies
security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model. We introduce
the concept of a history-free reduction which is a category of classical
random oracle reductions that basically determine oracle answers inde-
pendently of the history of previous queries, and we prove that such
reductions imply security in the quantum model. We then show that
certain post-quantum proposals, including ones based on lattices, can
be proven secure using history-free reductions and are therefore post-
quantum secure. We conclude with a rich set of open problems in this
area.
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1 Introduction
The threat to existing public-key systems posed by quantum computation [Sho97]
has generated considerable interest in post-quantum cryptosystems, namely sys-
tems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary. A promising
direction is lattice-based cryptography, where the underlying problems are re-
lated to finding short vectors in high dimensional lattices. These problems have
so far remained immune to quantum attacks and some evidence suggests that
they may be hard for quantum computers [Reg02].
As it is often the case, the most efficient constructions in lattice-based cryp-
tography are set in the random oracle (RO) model [BR93]. For example, Gentry,
Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] give elegant random oracle model con-
structions for existentially unforgeable signatures and for identity-based encryp-
tion. Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [GKV10] construct a random oracle
model group signature scheme. Boneh and Freeman [BF11] give a random or-
acle homomorphic signature scheme and Cayrel et al. [CLRS10] give a lattice-
based signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir random oracle heuristic. Some of
these lattice constructions can now be realized without random oracles, but at
a significant cost in performance [CHKP10,ABB10a,Boy10].
Modeling Random Oracles for Quantum Attackers. While quantum re-
sistance is good motivation for lattice-based constructions, most random oracle
systems to date are only proven secure relative to an adversary with classical
access to the random oracle. In this model the adversary is given oracle access
to a random hash function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and it can only “learn” a value
O(x) by querying the oracle O at the classical state x. However, to obtain a
concrete system, the random oracle is eventually replaced by a concrete hash
function thereby enabling a quantum attacker to evaluate this hash function on
quantum states. To capture this issue in the model, we allow the adversary to
evaluate the random oracle “in superposition”, that is, the adversary can submit
quantum states |ϕ〉 =∑αx |x〉 to the oracle O and receives back the evaluated
state
∑
αx |O(x)〉 (appropriately encoded to make the transformation unitary).
We call this the quantum(-accessible) random oracle model. It complies with
similar efforts from learning theory [BJ99,SG04] and computational complex-
ity [BBBV97] where oracles are quantum-accessible, and from lower bounds for
quantum collision finders [AS04]. Still, since we are only interested in classical
cryptosystems, honest parties and the scheme’s algorithms can access O only
via classical bit strings.
Proving security in the quantum-accessible RO model is considerably harder
than in the classical model. As a simple example, consider the case of digital
signatures. A standard proof strategy in the classical settings is to choose ran-
domly one of the adversary’s RO queries and embed in the response a given
instance of a challenge problem. One then hopes that the adversary uses this re-
sponse in his signature forgery. If the adversary makes q random oracle queries,
then this happens with probability 1/q and since q is polynomial this success
probability is sufficiently high for the proof of security in the classical setting.
Unfortunately, this strategy fails completely in the quantum-accessible random
oracle model since every random oracle query potentially evaluates the random
oracle at exponentially many points. Therefore, embedding the challenge in one
response will be of no use to the reduction algorithm. This simple example shows
that proving security in the classical RO model does not necessarily prove post-
quantum security.
More abstractly, the following common classical proof techniques are not
known to carry over to the quantum settings offhand:
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– Adaptive Programmability: The classical random oracle model allows a sim-
ulator to program the answers of the random oracle for an adversary, often
adaptively. Since the quantum adversary can query the random oracle with
a state in superposition, the adversary may get some information about all
exponentially many values right at the beginning, thereby making it difficult
to program the oracle adaptively.
– Extractability/Preimage Awareness: Another application of the random ora-
cle model for classical adversaries is that the simulator learns the pre-images
the adversary is interested in. This is, for example, crucial to simulate de-
cryption queries in the security proof for OAEP [FOPS01]. For quantum-
accessible oracles the actual query may be hidden in a superposition of ex-
ponentially many states, and it is unclear how to extract the right query.
– Efficient Simulation: In the classical world, we can simulate an exponential-
size random oracle efficiently via lazy sampling: simply pick random but
consistent answers “on the fly”. With quantum-accessible random oracles
the adversary can evaluate the random oracle on all inputs simultaneously,
making it harder to apply the on-demand strategy for classical oracles.
– Rewinding/Partial Consistency: Certain random oracle proofs [PS00] require
rewinding the adversary, replaying some hash values but changing at least a
single value. Beyond the usual problems of rewinding quantum adversaries,
we again encounter the fact that we may not be able to change hash values
unnoticed. We note that some form of rewinding is possible for quantum
zero-knowledge [Wat09].
We do not claim that these problems are insurmountable. In fact, we show
how to resolve the issue of efficient simulation by using (quantum-accessible)
pseudorandom functions. These are pseudorandom functions where the quan-
tum distinguisher can submit quantum states to the pseudorandom or random
oracle. By this technique, we can efficiently simulate the quantum-accessible ran-
dom oracle through the (efficient) pseudorandom function. While pseudorandom
functions where the distinguisher may use quantum power but only gets classi-
cal access to the function can be derived from quantum-immune pseudorandom
generators [GGM86], it is an open problem if the stronger quantum-accessible
pseudorandom functions exist.
Note, too, that we do not seek to solve the problems related to the random
oracle model which appear already in the classical settings [CGH98]. Instead we
show that for post-quantum security one should allow for quantum access to
the random oracle in order to capture attacks that are available when the hash
function is eventually instantiated.
1.1 Our Contributions
Separation. We begin with a separation between the classical and quantum-
accessible RO models by presenting a two-party protocol which is:
– secure in the classical random oracle model,
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– secure against quantum attackers with classical access to the random oracle
model, but insecure under any implementation of the hash function, and
– insecure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
The protocol itself assumes that (asymptotically) quantum computers are faster
than classical (parallel) machines and uses the quadratic gap due to Grover’s
algorithms and its application to collision search [BHT98] to separate secure
from insecure executions.
Constructions. Next, we set out to give general conditions under which a
classical RO proof implies security for a quantum RO. Our goal is to provide
generic tools by which authors can simply state that their classical proof has the
“right” structure and therefore their proof implies quantum security. We give
two flavors of results:
– For signatures, we define a proof structure we call a history-free reduction
which roughly says that the reduction answers oracle queries independently
of the history of queries. We prove that any classical proof that happens
to be a history-free reduction implies quantum existential unforgeability for
the signature scheme. We then show that the GPV random oracle signature
scheme [GPV08] has a history-free reduction and is therefore secure in the
quantum settings.
Next, we consider signature schemes built from claw-free permutations. The
first is the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature system of Bellare and Rog-
away [BR93], for which we show that the classical proof technique due to
Coron [Cor00] is history-free. We also prove the quantum security of a variant
of FDH due to Katz and Wang [KW03] which has a tight security reduction.
Lastly, we note that, as observed in [GPV08], claw-free permutations give rise
to preimage sampleable trapdoor functions, which gives another FDH-like
signature scheme with a tight security reduction. In all three cases the re-
ductions in the quantum-accessible random oracle model achieve essentially
the same tightness as their classical analogs.
Interestingly, we do not know of a history-free reduction for the generic Full
Domain Hash of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93]. One reason is that proofs
for generic FDH must somehow program the random oracle, as shown in
[FLR+10]. We leave the quantum security of generic FDH as an interest-
ing open problem. It is worth noting that at this time the quantum secu-
rity of FDH is somewhat theoretical since we have no candidate quantum-
secure trapdoor permutation to instantiate the FDH scheme, though this
may change once a candidate is proposed.
– For encryption we prove the quantum CPA security of an encryption scheme
due to Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] and the quantum CCA security of a
hybrid encryption variant of [BR93].
Many open problems remain in this space. For signatures, it is still open to prove
the quantum security of signatures that result from applying the Fiat-Shamir
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heuristic to a Σ identification protocol, for example, as suggested in [CLRS10].
Similarly, proving security of generic FDH is still open. For CCA-secure encryp-
tion, it is unknown if generic CPA to CCA transformations, such as [FO99],
are secure in the quantum settings. Similarly, it is not known if lattice-based
identity-based encryption systems secure in the classical RO model (e.g. as
in [GPV08,ABB10b]) are also secure in the quantum random oracle model.
Related Work. The quantum random oracle model has been used in a few
previous constructions. Aaronson [Aar09] uses quantum random oracles to con-
struct unclonable public-key quantum money. Brassard and Salvail [BS08] give a
modified version of Merkle’s Puzzles, and show that any quantum attacker must
query the random (permutation) oracle asymptotically more times than honest
parties. Recently, a modified version was proposed that restores some level of se-
curity even in the presence of a quantum adversary [BHK+11]. Quantum random
oracles have also been used to prove impossibility results for quantum compu-
tation. For example, Bennett et al. [BBBV97] show that relative to a random
oracle, a quantum computer cannot solve all of NP.
Some progress toward identifying sufficient conditions under which classical
protocols are also quantum immune has been made by Unruh [Unr10] and Hall-
gren et al. [HSS11]. These results show that, if a cryptographic protocol can
be shown to be (computationally [HSS11] resp. statistically [Unr10]) secure in
Canetti’s universal composition (UC) framework [Can01] against classical ad-
versaries, then the protocol is also resistant against (computationally bounded
resp. unbounded) quantum adversaries. This, however, means that the underly-
ing protocol must already provide strong security guarantees in the first place,
namely, universal composition security, which is typically more than the afore-
mentioned schemes in the literature satisfy. This also applies to similar results
by Hallgren et al. [HSS11] for so-called simulation-based security notions for the
starting protocol. Furthermore, all these results do not seem to be applicable
immediately to the random oracle model where the quantum adversary now has
quantum access to the random function (but where the ideal functionality for the
random oracle in the UC framework would have only been defined for classical
access according to the classical protocol specification), and where the question
of instantiation is an integral step which needs to be considered.
2 Preliminaries
A non-negative function ǫ = ǫ(n) is negligible if, for all polynomials p(n) we have
that ǫ(n) < p(n)−1 for all sufficiently large n. The variational distance between
two distributions D1 and D2 over Ω is given by
|D1 −D2| =
∑
x∈Ω
|Pr[x|D1]− Pr[x|D2]|.
If the distance between two output distributions is ǫ, the difference in probability
of the output satisfying a certain property is at most ǫ.
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A classical randomized algorithm A can be thought of in two ways. In the
first, A is given an input x, Amakes some coin tosses during its computation, and
ultimately outputs some value y. We denote this action by A(x) where A(x) is a
random variable. Alternatively, we can give A both its input x and randomness r
in which case we denote this action as A(x; r). For a classical algorithm, A(x; r)
is deterministic. An algorithm A runs in probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if
it runs in polynomial time in the security parameter (which we often omit from
the input for sake of simplicity).
2.1 Quantum Computation
We briefly give some background on quantum computation and refer to [NC00]
for a more complete discussion. A quantum system A is associated to a (finite-
dimensional) complex Hilbert space HA with an inner product 〈·|·〉. The state
of the system is described by a vector |ϕ〉 ∈ HA such that the Euclidean norm
‖ |ϕ〉 ‖ =
√
〈ϕ|ϕ〉 is 1. Given quantum systems A and B over spaces HA and
HB, respectively, we define the joint or composite quantum system through the
tensor product HA ⊗ HB. The product state of |ϕA〉 ∈ HA and |ϕB〉 ∈ HB
is denoted by |ϕA〉 ⊗ |ϕB〉 or simply |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉. An n-qubit system lives in the
joint quantum system of n two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The standard or-
thonormal computational basis |x〉 for such a system is given by |x1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |xn〉
for x = x1 . . . xn. Any (classical) bit string x is encoded into a quantum state
as |x〉. An arbitrary pure n-qubit state |ϕ〉 can be expressed in the computa-
tional basis as |ϕ〉 =∑x∈{0,1}n αx |x〉 where αx are complex amplitudes obeying∑
x∈{0,1}n |αx|2 = 1.
Transformations. Evolutions of quantum systems are described by unitary trans-
formations with IA being the identity transformation on register A. Given a joint
quantum system over HA ⊗HB and a transformation UA acting only on HA, it
is understood that UA |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉 refers to (UA ⊗ IB) |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉.
Information can be extracted from a quantum state |ϕ〉 by performing a
positive-operator valued measurement (POVM) M = {Mi} with positive semi-
definite measurement operatorsMi that sum to the identity
∑
iMi = I. Outcome
i is obtained with probability pi = 〈ϕ|Mi |ϕ〉. A special case are projective
measurements such as the measurement in the computational basis of the state
|ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 which yields outcome x with probability |αx|2. We can also
do a partial measurement on some of the qubits. The probability of the partial
measurement resulting in a string x is the same as if we measured the whole state,
and ignored the rest of the qubits. In this case, the resulting state will be the same
as |φ〉, except that all the strings inconsistent with x are removed. This new state
will not have a norm of 1, so the actual superposition is obtained by dividing by
the norm. For example, if we measure the first n bits of |φ〉 = ∑x,y αx,y|x, y〉,
we will obtain the measurement x with probability
∑
y′ |αx,y′ |2, and in this case
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the resulting state will be
|x〉
∑
y
αx,y√∑
y′ |αx,y′ |2
|y〉.
Following [BBC+98], we model a quantum attacker AQ with access to (pos-
sibly identical) oracles O1, O2, . . . by a sequence of unitary transformations
U1, O1, U2, . . . , OT−1, UT over k = poly(n) qubits. Here, oracle Oi : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m maps the first n + m qubits from basis state |x〉 |y〉 to basis state
|x〉 |y ⊕Oi(x)〉 for x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}m. If we require the access to
Oi to be classical instead of quantum, the first n bits of the state are measured
before applying the unitary transformation corresponding to Oi. Notice that any
quantum-accessible oracle can also be used as a classical oracle. Note that the
algorithm AQ may also receive some input |ψ〉.
To introduce asymptotics we assume that AQ is actually a sequence of such
transformation sequences, indexed by parameter n, and that each transformation
sequence is composed out of quantum systems for input, output, oracle calls, and
work space (of sufficiently many qubits). To measure polynomial running time,
we assume that each Ui is approximated (to sufficient precision) by members
of a set of universal gates (say, Hadamard, phase, CNOT and π/8; for sake of
concreteness [NC00]), where at most polynomially many gates are used. Fur-
thermore, T = T (n) is assumed to be polynomial, too. Note that T also bounds
the number of oracle queries.
We define the Euclidean distance ||φ〉 − |ψ〉| between two states as the value(∑
x |αx − βx|2
) 1
2 where |φ〉 =∑x αx|x〉 and |ψ〉 =∑x βx|x〉.
Define qr(|φt〉) to be the magnitude squared of r in the superposition of query
t. We call this the query probability of r in query t. If we sum over all t, we get
the total query probability of r.
We will be using the following lemmas:
Lemma 2.1 ([BBBV97] Theorem 3.1). Let |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 be quantum states
with Euclidean distance at most ǫ. Then, performing the same measurement on
|ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 yields distributions with statistical distance at most 4ǫ.
Lemma 2.2 ([BBBV97] Theorem 3.3). Let AQ be a quantum algorithm run-
ning in time T with oracle access to O. Let ǫ > 0 and let S ⊆ [1, T ]× {0, 1}n be
a set of time-string pairs such that
∑
(t,r)∈S qr(|φt〉) ≤ ǫ. If we modify O into an
oracle O′ which answers each query r at time t by providing the same string R
(which has been independently sampled at random), then the Euclidean distance
between the final states of AQ when invoking O and O
′ is at most
√
T ǫ.
2.2 Quantum-Accessible Random Oracles
In the classical random oracle model [BR93] all algorithms used in the system are
given access to the same random oracle. In the proof of security, the reduction
algorithm answers the adversary’s queries with consistent random answers.
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In the quantum settings, a quantum attacker issues a random oracle query
which is itself a superposition of exponentially many states. The reduction al-
gorithm must evaluate the random oracle at all points in the superposition. To
ensure that random oracle queries are answered consistently across queries, it
is convenient to assume that quantum-resistant pseudorandom functions exist,
and to implement this auxiliary random oracle with such a PRF.
Definition 2.3 (Pseudorandom Function). A quantum-accessible pseudo-
random function is an efficiently computable function PRF where, for all efficient
quantum algorithms D,∣∣∣Pr[DPRF(k,·)(1n) = 1]− Pr[DO(·)(1n) = 1]∣∣∣ < ǫ
where ǫ = ǫ(n) is negligible in n, and where O is a random oracle, the first
probability is over the keys k of length n, and the second probability is over all
random oracles and the sampling of the result of D.
We note that, followingWatrous [Wat09], indistinguishability as above should
still hold for any auxiliary quantum state σ given as additional input to D (akin
to non-uniformity for classical algorithms). We do not include such auxiliary
information in our definition in order to simplify.
We say that an oracle O′ is computationally indistinguishable from a ran-
dom oracle if, for all polynomial time quantum algorithms with oracle access, the
variational distance of the output distributions when the oracle is O′ and when
the oracle is a truly random oracle O is negligible. Thus, simulating a random
oracle with a quantum-accessible pseudorandom function is computationally in-
distinguishable from a true random oracle.
We remark that, instead of assuming that quantum-accessible PRFs exist,
we can often carry out security reductions relative to a random oracle. Con-
sider, for example, a signature scheme (in the quantum-accessible random oracle
model) which we prove to be unforgeable for quantum adversaries, via a reduc-
tion to the one-wayness of a trapdoor permutation against quantum inverters.
We can then formally first claim that the scheme is unforgeable as long as in-
verting the trapdoor permutation is infeasible even when having the additional
power of a quantum-accessible random oracle; only in the next step we can
then conclude that this remains true in the standard model, if we assume that
quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist and let the inverter simulate
the random oracle with such a PRF. We thus still get a potentially reasonable
security claim even if such PRFs do not exist. This technique works whenever
we can determine the success of the adversary (as in case of inverting a one-way
function).
2.3 Hard Problems for Quantum Computers
We will use the following general notion of a hard problem.
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Definition 2.4 (Problem). A problem is a pair P = (GameP , αP ) where
GameP specifies a game that a (possibly quantum) adversary plays with a clas-
sical challenger. The game works as follows:
• On input 1n, the challenger computes a value x, which it sends to the ad-
versary as its input
• The adversary is then run on x, and is allowed to make classical queries to
the challenger.
• The adversary then outputs a value y, which it sends to the challenger.
• The challenger then looks at x, y, and the classical queries made by the
adversary, and outputs 1 or 0.
The value αP is a real number between 0 (inclusive) and 1 (exclusive). It may
also be a function of n, but for this paper, we only need constant αP , specifically
αP is always 0 or
1
2 .
We say that an adversary A wins the game GameP if the challenger outputs
1. We define the advantage AdvA,P of A in problem P as
AdvA,P = |Pr[A wins in GameP ]− αP |
Definition 2.5 (Hard Problem). A problem P = (GameP , αP ) is hard for
quantum computers if, for all polynomial time quantum adversaries A, AdvA,P
is negligible.
2.4 Cryptographic Primitives
For this paper, we define the security of standard cryptographic primitives in
terms of certain problems being hard for quantum computers. We give a brief
sketch here and refer to the appendix for supplementary details.
A trapdoor function F is secure if Inv(F) = (GameINV(F), 0) is a hard
problem for quantum computers, where in GameINV, an adversary is given a
random element y and public key, and succeeds if it can output an inverse for
y relative to the public key. A preimage sampleable trapdoor function, F , is
secure if Inv(F) as described above is hard, and if Col(F) = (GameCol(F), 0)
is hard for quantum computers, where in GameCol, an adversary is given a
public key, succeeds if it can output a collision relative to that public key. A
signature scheme S is secure if the game Sig-Forge(S) = (GameSig(S), 0) is hard,
where GameSig is the standard existential unforgeability under a chosen message
attack game. Lastly, a private (resp. public) key encryption scheme E is secure
if Sym-CCA(E) = (GameSym(E), 12 ) (resp. Asym-CCA(E) = (GameAsym(E), 12 )),
where GameSym is the standard private key CCA attack game, and GameAsym
is the standard public key attack game.
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3 Separation Result
In this section, we discuss a two-party protocol that is provably secure in the ran-
dom oracle model against both classical and quantum adversaries with classical
access to the random oracle (and when using quantum-immune primitives). We
then use the polynomial gap between the birthday attack and a collision finder
based on Grover’s algorithm to show that the protocol remains secure for cer-
tain hash functions when only classical adversaries are considered, but becomes
insecure for any hash function if quantum adversaries are allowed. Analyzing
the protocol in the stronger quantum random oracle model, where we grant the
adversary quantum access to the random oracle, yields the same negative result.
3.1 Preliminaries
We start this section by presenting the necessary definitions and assumptions
for our construction. For sake of simplicity, we start with a quantum-immune
identification scheme to derive our protocol; any other primitive or protocol can
be used in a similar fashion.
Identification Schemes. An identification scheme IS consists of three efficient
algorithms (IS.KGen,P ,V) where IS.KGen on input 1n returns a key pair (sk, pk).
The joint execution of P(sk, pk) and V(pk) then defines an interactive protocol
between the prover P and the verifier V . At the end of the protocol V outputs
a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We assume completeness in the sense that for any
honest prover the verifier accepts the interaction with output b = 1. Security of
identification schemes is usually defined by considering an adversary A that first
interacts with the honest prover to obtain some information about the secret
key. In a second stage, the adversary then plays the role of the prover and has
to make a verifier accept the interaction. We say that an identification scheme is
sound if the adversary can convince the verifier with negligible probability only.
(Near-)Collision-Resistant Hash Functions. A hash functionH = (H.KGen,H.Eval)
is a pair of efficient algorithms such that H.KGen for input 1n returns a key
k (which contains 1n), and H.Eval for input k and M ∈ {0, 1}∗ determinis-
tically outputs a digest H.Eval(k,M). For a random oracle H we use k as a
“salt” and consider the random function H(k, ·). The hash function is called
near-collision-resistant if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that for
k ← H.KGen(1n), some constant 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n and (M,M ′) ← A(k, ℓ) we have
M 6=M ′ but H.Eval(k,M)|ℓ = H.Eval(k,M ′)|ℓ, is negligible (as a function of n).
Here we denote by x|ℓ the leading ℓ bits of the string x. Note that for ℓ = n the
above definition yields the standard notion of collision-resistance.
In the classical setting, (near-)collision-resistance for any hash function is
upper bounded by the birthday attack. This generic attack states that for any
hash function with n bits output, an attacker can find a collision with probability
roughly 1/2 by probing 2n/2 distinct and random inputs. For random oracles this
attack is optimal.
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Grover’s Algorithm and Quantum Collision Search. Grover’s algorithm [Gro96,Gro98]
performs a search on an unstructured database with N elements in time O(
√
N)
while the best classical algorithm requires O(N) steps. Roughly, this is achieved
by using superpositions to examine all entries “at the same time”. Brassard et
al. [BHT98] showed that this speed-up can also be obtained for solving the col-
lision problem for a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. Therefore, one first
selects a subset K of the domain {0, 1}∗ and then applies Grover’s algorithm on
an indicator function f that tests for any input M ∈ {0, 1}∗\K if there exists an
M ′ ∈ K such that H(M) = H(M ′) holds. By setting |K| = 3√2n, the algorithm
finds a collision after O( 3
√
2n) evaluations of H with probability at least 1/2.
Computational and Timing Assumptions. To allow reasonable statements about
the security of our protocol we need to formalize assumptions concerning the
computational power of the adversary and the time that elapses on quantum
and classical computers. We first demand that the speed-up one can gain by
using a parallel machine with many processors, is bounded by a fixed term. This
basically resembles the fact that in the real world there is only a concrete and
finite amount of equipment available that can contribute to such a performance
gain.
Assumption 1 (Parallel Speed-Up) Let T (C) denote the time that is re-
quired to solve a problem C on a classical computer, and TP (C) is the required
time that elapses on a parallel system. Then, there exist a constant α ≥ 1, such
that for any problem C it holds that TP (C) ≥ T (C)/α.
We also introduce two assumptions regarding the time that is needed to
evaluate a hash function or to send a message between two parties. Note that
both assumptions are merely for the sake of convenience, as one could patch the
idea by relating the timings more rigorously. The first assumption states that
the time that is required to evaluate a hash function H is independent of the
input and the computational environment.
Assumption 2 (Unit Time) For any hash function H and any input message
M (resp. MQ for quantum-state inputs) the evaluation of H(M) requires a con-
stant time T (H(M)) = TP (H(M)) = TQ(H(MQ)) (where TQ denotes the time
that elapses on a quantum computer).
Furthermore, we do not charge any extra time for sending and receiving
messages, or for any computation other than evaluating a hash function (e.g.,
maintaining lists of values).
Assumption 3 (Zero Time) Any computation or action that does not require
the evaluation of a hash function, costs zero time.
The latter assumption implicitly states that the computational overhead that
quantum algorithms may create to obtain a speed-up is negligible when com-
pared to the costs of a hash evaluation. This might be too optimistic in the near
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future, as indicated by Bernstein [Ber09]. That is, Bernstein discussed that the
overall costs of a quantum computation can be higher than of massive paral-
lel computation. However, as our work addresses conceptional issues that arise
when efficient quantum computers exist, this assumption is somewhat inherent
in our scenario.
3.2 Construction
We now present our identification scheme between a prover P and a verifier V
(see Figure 1) The main idea is to augment a secure identification scheme IS
by a collision-finding stage for some hash function H. In this first stage, the
verifier checks if the prover is able to produce collisions on a hash function in
a particular time. More precisely, the verifier starts for timekeeping to evaluate
the hash function H.Eval(k, ·) on the messages 〈c〉 for c = 1, 2, . . . ,
⌈
3
√
2ℓ
⌉
for a
key k chosen by the verifier and where 〈c〉 stands for the binary representation
of c with log
⌈
3
√
2ℓ
⌉
bits. The prover has now to respond with a near-collision
M 6=M ′ such that H.Eval(k,M) = H.Eval(k,M ′) holds for the first ℓ bits. One
round of the collision-stage ends if the verifier either receives such a collision or
finishes its
3
√
2ℓ hash evaluations. The verifier and the receiver then repeat such
a round r = poly(n) times, sending a fresh key k in each round.
Subsequently, both parties run the standard identification scheme. At the
end, the verifier accepts if the prover was able to find enough collisions in the
first stage or identifies correctly in the second stage. Thus, as long as the prover is
not able to produce collisions in the required time, the protocol mainly resembles
the IS protocol.
Completeness of the IS∗ protocol follows easily from the completeness of the
underlying IS scheme.
Security against Classical and Quantum Adversaries. To prove security of our
protocol, we need to show that an adversary A after interacting with an honest
prover P∗, can subsequently not impersonate P∗ such that V∗ will accept the
identification. Let ℓ be such that ℓ > 6 log(α) where α is the constant reflecting
the bounded speed-up in parallel computing from Assumption (1). By assuming
that IS = (IS.KGen,P ,V) is a quantum-immune identification scheme, we can
show that IS∗ is secure in the standard random oracle model against classical
and quantum adversaries.
The main idea is that for the standard random oracle model, the ability of
finding collisions is bounded by the birthday attack. Due to the constraint of
granting only time O(
3
√
2ℓ) for the collision search and setting ℓ > 6 log(α), even
an adversary with quantum or parallel power is not able to make at least
√
2ℓ
random oracle queries. Thus, A has only negligible probability to respond in
more than 1/4 of r rounds with a collision.
When considering only classical adversaries, we can also securely instantiate
the random oracle by a hash function H that provides near-collision-resistance
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Verifier V∗ Prover P∗
pk, ℓ ≤ log(n), collCount = 0 (sk, pk)← IS.KGen(1n), ℓ
collision stage (repeat for i = 1, 2, . . . , r):
ki ← H.KGen(1n)
compute H.Eval(〈1〉) ki−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ search for ℓ-near
compute H.Eval(〈2〉) collision on H(ki, ·)
...
Mi,M
′
i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
compute H.Eval(〈c〉)
stop if c >
⌈
3
√
2ℓ
⌉
or
H.Eval(ki,Mi)|ℓ = H.Eval(ki,M ′i)|ℓ
if collision was found set
collCount := collCount+ 1
identification stage:
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
decision bit b
〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
accept if b = 1
or collCount > r/4
Fig. 1. The IS∗-Identification Protocol
close to the birthday bound. Note that this property is particularly required
from the SHA-3 candidates [NIS07].
However, for adversaries AQ with quantum power, such an instantiation is
not possible for any hash function. This stems from the fact that AQ can locally
evaluate a hash function on quantum states which in turns allows to apply
Grover’s search algorithm. Then an adversary will find a collision in time
3
√
2ℓ
with probability at least 1/2, and thus will be able to provide r/4 collisions with
noticeable probability. The same result holds in the quantum-accessible random
oracle model, since Grover’s algorithm only requires (quantum) black-box access
to the hash function.
Formal proofs of all statements are given in Appendix B.
4 Signature Schemes in the Quantum-Accessible Random
Oracle Model
We now turn to proving security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
We present general conditions for when a proof of security in the classical random
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oracle model implies security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
The result in this section applies to signatures whose classical proof of security
is a history-free reduction as defined next. Roughly speaking, history-freeness
means that the classical proof of security simulates the random oracle and sig-
nature oracle in a history-free fashion. That is, its responses to queries do not
depend on responses to previous queries or the query number. We then show that
a number of classical signature schemes have a history-free reduction thereby
proving their security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
Definition 4.1 (History-free Reduction). A random oracle model signature
scheme S = (G,SO, V O) has a history-free reduction from a hard problem P =
(GameP , 0) if there is a proof of security that uses a classical PPT adversary A
for S to construct a classical PPT algorithm B for problem P such that:
• Algorithm B for P contains four explicit classical algorithms: START,
RAND
Oc , SIGNOc , and FINISHOc . The latter three algorithms have ac-
cess to a shared classical random oracle Oc. These algorithms, except for
RAND
Oc , may also make queries to the challenger for problem P . The al-
gorithms are used as follows:
(1) Given an instance x for problem P as input, algorithm B first runs
START(x) to obtain (pk, z) where pk is a signature public key and z is
private state to be used by B. Algorithm B sends pk to A and plays the
role of challenger to A.
(2) When A makes a classical random oracle query to O(r), algorithm B re-
sponds with RANDOc(r, z). Note that RAND is given the current query
as input, but is unaware of previous queries and responses.
(3) When A makes a classical signature query S(sk,m), algorithm B re-
sponds with SIGNOc(m, z).
(4) When A outputs a signature forgery candidate (m,σ), algorithm B out-
puts FINISHOc(m,σ, z).
• There is an efficiently computable function INSTANCE(pk) which pro-
duces an instance x of problem P such that START(x) = (pk, z) for some z.
Consider the process of first generating (sk, pk) from G(1n), and then com-
puting x = INSTANCE(pk). The distribution of x generated in this way is
negligibly close to the distribution of x generated in GameP .
• For fixed z, consider the classical random oracle O(r) = RANDOc(r, z).
Define a quantum oracle Oquant, which transforms a basis element |x, y〉
into |x, y ⊕O(x)〉. We require that Oquant is quantum computationally in-
distinguishable from a random oracle.
• SIGNOc either aborts (and hence B aborts) or it generates a valid signa-
ture relative to the oracle O(r) = RANDOc(r, z) with a distribution negli-
gibly close to the correct signing algorithm. The probability that none of the
signature queries abort is non-negligible.
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• If (m,σ) is a valid signature forgery relative to the public key pk and oracle
O(r) = RANDOc(r, z) then the output of B (i.e. FINISHOc(m,σ, z)) causes
the challenger for problem P to output 1 with non-negligible probability. ⊓⊔
We now show that history-free reductions imply security in the quantum setting.
Theorem 4.2. Let S = (G,S, V ) be a signature scheme. Suppose that there is
a history-free reduction that uses a classical PPT adversary A for S to con-
struct a PPT algorithm B for a problem P . Further, assume that P is hard for
polynomial-time quantum computers, and that quantum-accessible pseudorandom
functions exist. Then S is secure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
Proof. The history-free reduction includes five (classical) algorithms START,
RAND, SIGN, FINISH, and INSTANCE, as in Definition 4.1. We prove the
quantum security of S using a sequence of games, where the first game is the
standard quantum signature game with respect to S.
Game 0. Define Game0 as the game a quantum adversary AQ plays for prob-
lem Sig-Forge(S). Assume towards contradiction that AQ has a non-negligible
advantage.
Game 1. Define Game1 as the following modification to Game0: after the
challenger generates (sk, pk), it computes x ← INSTANCE(pk) as well as
(pk, z) ← START(x). Further, instead of answering AQ’s quantum random
oracle queries with a truly random oracle, the challenger simulates for AQ a
quantum-accessible random oracle Oquant as an oracle that maps a basis ele-
ment |x, y〉 into the element
∣∣x, y ⊕RANDOc(x, z)〉, where Oc is a truly (classi-
cal) random oracle. The history-free guarantee on RAND ensures that Oquant is
computationally indistinguishable from random for quantum adversaries. There-
fore, the success probability of AQ in Game1 is negligibly close to its success
probability in Game0, and hence is non-negligible.
Game 2. Modify the challenger from Game1 as follows: instead of generating
(sk, pk) and computing x = INSTANCE(pk), start off by running the challenger
for problem P . When that challenger sends x, then start the challenger from
Game1 using this x. Also, when AQ asks for a signature on m, answer with
SIGN
Oc(m, z). First, since INSTANCE is part of a history-free reduction, this
change in how we compute x only negligibly affects the distribution of x, and
hence the behavior of AQ. Second, as long as all signing algorithms succeed,
changing how we answer signing queries only negligibly affects the behavior of
AQ. Thus, the probability that AQ succeeds is the product of the following two
probabilities:
• The probability that all of the signing queries are answered without abort-
ing.
• The probability that AQ produces a valid forgery given that the signing
queries were answered successfully.
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The first probability is non-negligible by assumption, and the second is negligibly
close to the success probability of AQ in Game1, which is also non-negligible.
This means that the success probability of AQ in Game2 is non-negligible.
Game 3. Define Game3 as in Game2, except for two modifications to the chal-
lenger: First, it generates a key k for the quantum-accessible PRF. Then, to
answer a random oracle query Oquant(|φ〉), the challenger applies the unitary
transformation that takes a basis element |x, y〉 into |x, y ⊕ PRF(k, x)〉. If the
success probability in Game3 was non-negligibly different from that of Game2,
we could construct a distinguisher for PRF which plays both the role of AQ and
the challenger. Hence, the success probability in Game3 is negligibly close to
that of Game2, and hence is also non-negligible.
Given a quantum adversary that has non-negligible advantage in Game 3 we
construct a quantum algorithm BQ that breaks problem P . When BQ receives
instance x from the challenger for problem P , it computes (pk, z)← START(x)
and generates a key k for PRF. Then, it simulates AQ on pk. BQ answers random
oracle queries using a quantum-accessible function built from RANDPRF(k,·)(·, z)
as in Game 1. It answers signing queries using SIGNPRF(k,·)(·, z). Then, when
AQ outputs a forgery candidate (m,σ), BQ computes FINISH
PRF(k,·)(m,σ, z),
and returns the result to the challenger for problem P .
Observe that the behavior of AQ in Game3 is identical to that as a subroutine
of BQ. Hence, AQ as a subroutine of BQ will output a valid forgery (m,σ) with
non-negligible probability. If (m,σ) is a valid forgery, then since FINISH is part
of a history-free reduction, FINISHPRF(k,·)(m,σ, z) will cause the challenger for
problem P to accept with non-negligible probability. Thus, the probability that
P accepts is also non-negligible, contradicting our assumption that P is hard for
quantum computers.
Hence we have shown that any polynomial quantum algorithm has negligible
advantage against problem Sig-Forge(S) which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
We note that, in every step of the algorithm, the adversary AQ remains in a
pure state. This is because, in each game, AQ’s state is initially pure (since it is
classical), and every step of the game either involves a unitary transformation, a
partial measurement, or classical communication. In all three cases, if the state
is pure before, it is also pure after.
We also note that we could have stopped at Game2 and assumed that the
cryptographic problem P is hard relative to a (quantum-accessible) random or-
acle. Assuming the existence of quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions al-
lows us to draw the same conclusion in the standard (i.e., non-relativized) model
at the expense of an extra assumption.
4.1 Secure Signatures From Preimage Sampleable Trapdoor
Functions (PSF)
We now use Theorem 4.2 to prove the security of the Full Domain Hash signature
scheme when instantiated with a preimage sampleable trapdoor function (PSF),
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such as the one proposed in [GPV08]. Loosely speaking, a PSF F is a tuple
of PPT algorithms (G, Sample, f, f−1) where G(·) generates a key pair (pk, sk),
f(pk, ·) defines an efficiently computable function, f−1(sk, y) samples from the
set of pre-images of y, and Sample(pk) samples x from the domain of f(pk, ·)
such that f(pk, x) is statistically close to uniform in the range of f(pk, ·). The
PSF of [GPV08] is not only one-way, but is also collision resistant.
Recall that the full domain hash (FDH) signature scheme [BR93] is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Full Domain Hash). Let F = (G0, f, f−1) be a trapdoor
permutation, and O a hash function whose range is the same as the range of f .
The full domain hash signature scheme is S = (G, T, V ) where:
• G = G0
• SO(sk,m) = f−1(sk, O(m))
• V O(pk,m, σ) =
{
1 if O(m) = f(pk, σ)
0 otherwise
Gentry et al. [GPV08] show that the FDH signature scheme can be instan-
tiated with a PSF F = (G, Sample, f, f−1) instead of a trapdoor permutation.
Call the resulting system FDH-PSF. They prove that FDH-PSF is secure against
classical adversaries, provided that the pre-image sampling algorithm used dur-
ing signing is derandomized (e.g. by using a classical PRF to generate its random
bits). Their reduction is not quite history-free, but we show that it can be made
history-free.
Consider the following reduction from a classical adversary A for the FDH-
PSF scheme S to a classical collision finder B for F :
• On input pk, B computes START(pk) := (pk, pk), and simulates A on pk.
• When A queries O(r), B responds with
RAND
Oc(r, pk) := f(pk, Sample(1n;Oc(r))).
• When A queries S(sk,m), B responds with
SIGN
Oc(m, pk) := Sample(1n;Oc(m)).
• When A outputs (m,σ), B outputs
FINISH
Oc(m,σ, pk) :=
(
Sample
(
1n;Oc(m)
)
, σ
)
.
In addition, we define INSTANCE(pk) := pk. Algorithms INSTANCE and
START trivially satisfy the requirements of history-freeness (Definition 4.1).
Before showing that the above reduction is in history-free form, we need the
following technical lemma whose proof is given in the appendix .
Lemma 4.4. Say A is a quantum algorithm that makes q quantum oracle queries.
Suppose further that we draw the oracle O from two distributions. The first is the
random oracle distribution. The second is the distribution of oracles where the
value of the oracle at each input x is identically and independently distributed by
some distribution D whose variational distance is within ǫ from uniform. Then
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the variational distance between the distributions of outputs of A with each oracle
is at most 4q2
√
ǫ.
Proof Sketch. We show that there is a way of moving from O to OD such
that the oracle is only changed on inputs in a set K where the sum of the
amplitudes squared of all k ∈ K, over all queries made by A, is small. Thus,
we can use Lemma 2.2 to show that the expected behavior of any algorithm
making polynomially many quantum queries to O is only changed by a small
amount. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.4 shows that we can replace a truly random oracle O with an oracle
OD distributed according to distribution D without impacting A, provided D is
close to uniform. Note, however, that while this change only affects the output
of A negligibly, the effects are larger than in the classical setting. If A only made
classical queries to O, a simple hybrid argument shows that changing to OD
affects the distribution of the output of A by at most qǫ, as opposed to 4q2
√
ǫ in
the quantum case. Thus, quantum security reductions that use Lemma 4.4 will
not be as tight as their classical counterparts.
We now show that the reduction above is history-free.
Theorem 4.5. The reduction above applied to FDH-PSF is history-free.
Proof. The definition of a PSF implies that the distribution of f(pk, Sample(1n))
is within ǫsample of uniform, for some negligible ǫsample. Now, since O(r) =
RAND
Oc(r, pk) = f(pk, Sample(1n;Oc(r))) and Oc is a true random oracle,
the quantity O(r) is distributed independently according to a distribution that
is ǫsample away from uniform. Define a quantum oracle Oquant which transforms
the basis state |x, y〉 into |x, y ⊕O(x)〉. Using Lemma 4.4, for any algorithm
B making q random oracle queries, the variational distance between the prob-
ability distributions of the outputs of B using a truly random oracle and the
“not-quite” random oracle Oquant is at most 4q
2√ǫsample, which is still negligi-
ble. Hence, Oquant is computationally indistinguishable from random.
Gentry et al. [GPV08] also show that SIGNOc(m, pk) is consistent with
RAND
Oc(·, pk) for all queries, and that if A outputs a valid forgery (m,σ),
FINISH
Oc(m,σ, pk) produces a collision for F with probability 1− 2−E , where
E is the minimum over all y in the range of f(pk, ·) of the min-entropy of the
distribution on σ given f(pk, σ) = y. The PSF of Gentry et al. [GPV08] has
super-logarithmic min-entropy, so 1 − 2−E is negligibly close to 1, though any
constant non-zero min-entropy will suffice to make the quantity a non-negligible
fraction of 1. ⊓⊔
We note that the security proof of Gentry et al. [GPV08] is a tight reduction
in the following sense: if the advantage of an adversaryA for S is ǫ, the reduction
gives a collision finding adversary B for F with advantage negligibly close to ǫ,
provided that the lower bound over y in the range of f(pk, ·) of the min-entropy
of σ given f(pk, σ) = y is super-logarithmic. If the PSF has a min-entropy of 1,
the advantage of B is still ǫ/2.
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The following corollary, which is the main result of this section, follows from
Theorems (4.2) and (4.5).
Corollary 4.6. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist, and F is
a secure PSF against quantum adversaries, then the FDH-PSF signature scheme
is secure in the quantum-accessible random oracle model.
4.2 Secure Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations
In this section, we show how to use claw-free permutations to construct three sig-
nature schemes that have history-free reductions and are therefore secure in the
quantum-accessible random oracle model. The first is the standard FDH from
Definition 4.3, but when the underlying permutation is a claw-free permutation.
We adapt the proof of Coron [Cor00] to give a history-free reduction. The second
is the Katz and Wang [KW03] signature scheme, and we also modify their proof
to get a history-free reduction. Lastly, following Gentry et al. [GPV08], we note
that claw-free permutations give rise to a pre-image sampleable trapdoor func-
tion (PSF), which can then be used in FDH to get a secure signature scheme as
in Section 4.1. The Katz-Wang and FDH-PSF schemes from claw-free permuta-
tions give a tight reduction, whereas the Coron-based proof loses a factor of qs
in the security reduction, where qs is the number of signing queries.
Recall that a claw-free pair of permutations [GMR88] is a pair of trapdoor
permutations (F1,F2), where Fi = (Gi, fi, f−1i ), with the following properties:
• G1 = G2. Define G = G1 = G2.
• For any key pk, f1(pk, ·) and f2(pk, ·) have the same domain and range.
• Given only pk, the probability that any PPT adversary can find a pair
(x1, x2) such that f1(pk, x1) = f2(pk, x2) is negligible. Such a pair is called
a claw.
Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] note that claw-free permutations are a general-
ization of trapdoor permutations with a random self-reduction. A random self-
reduction is a way of taking a worst-case instance x of a problem, and converting
it into a random instance y of the same problem, such that a solution to y gives
a solution to x. Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] show that any trapdoor permutation
with a random self reduction (e.g. RSA) gives a claw-free pair of permutations.
We note that currently there are no candidate pairs of claw-free permutations
that are secure against quantum adversaries, but this may change in time.
FDH Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations Coron [Cor00] shows that
the Full Domain Hash signature scheme, when instantiated with the RSA trap-
door permutation, has a tighter security reduction than the general Full Domain
Hash scheme, in the classical world. That is, Coron’s reduction loses a factor
of approximately qs, the number of signing queries, as apposed to qh, the num-
ber of hash queries. Of course, the RSA trapdoor permutation is not secure
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against quantum adversaries, but his reduction can be applied to any claw-free
permutation and is equivalent to a history-free reduction with similar tightness.
To construct a FDH signature scheme from a pair of claw-free permutations
(F1,F2), we simply instantiate FDH with F1, and ignore the second permutation
F2, to yield the following signature scheme
• G is the generator for the pair of claw-free permutations.
• SO(sk,m) = f−11 (sk, O(m))
• V O(pk,m, σ) = 1 if and only if f1(pk, σ) = O(m).
We now present a history-free reduction for this scheme. The random oracle
for this reduction, Oc(r), returns a random pair (a, b), where a is a random
element from the domain of F1 and F2, and b is a random element from {1, ..., p}
for some p to be chosen later.
We construct history-free reduction from a classical adversary A for S to a
classical adversary B for (F1,F2). Algorithm B, on input pk, works as follows:
• Compute START(pk, y) = (pk, pk), and simulate A on pk. Notice that z =
pk is the state saved by B.
• When A queries O(r), compute RANDOc(r, pk). For each string r, RAND
works as follows: compute (a, b) ← Oc(r). If b = 1, return f2(pk, a). Other-
wise, return f1(pk, a)
• When A queries S(sk,m), compute SIGNOc(m, pk). SIGN works as follows:
compute (a, b)← Oc(m) and return a if b 6= 1. Otherwise, fail.
• When A returns (m,σ), compute FINISHOc(m,σ, pk). FINISH works as
follows: compute (a, b)← Oc(m) and output (σ, a).
In addition, we have INSTANCE(pk) = pk and START(INSTANCE(pk)) =
(pk, pk), so INSTANCE and START satisfy the required properties.
Theorem 4.7. The reduction above is in history-free form.
Proof. RANDOc(r, pk) is completely random and independently distributed,
as f1(pk, a) and f2(pk, a) are both random (fb(pk, ·) is a permutation and a is
truly random). As long as b 6= 1, where (a, b) = Oc(m), SIGNOc(m, pk) will be
consistent with RAND. This is because V RAND
Oc (·,pk)(pk,m,SIGNOc(m, pk))
outputs 1 if RANDOc(m, pk) = f1(pk,SIGN
Oc(m, pk)). ButRANDOc(m, pk) =
f1(pk, a) (since b 6= 1), and SIGNOc(m, pk)) = a. Thus, the equality holds. The
probability over all signature queries of no failure is (1 − 1/p)qSIGN . If we chose
p = qSIGN, this quantity is at least e
−1 − o(1), which is non-negligible.
Suppose A returns a valid forgery (m,σ), meaning A never asked for a forgery
on m and f1(sk, σ) = RAND
Oc(m, pk). If b = 1 (where (a, b) = Oc(m)), then
we have f1(sk, σ) = RAND
Oc(m, pk) = f2(pk, a), meaning that (σ, a) is a claw.
Since A never asked for a signature on m, there is no way A could have figured
out a, so the case where b = 1 and a is the preimage of O(m) under f2, and the
case where b 6= 1 and a is the preimage of O(m) under f1 are indistinguishable.
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Thus, b = 1 with probability 1/p. Thus, B converts a valid signature into a claw
with non-negligible probability. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4.8. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, and (F1,F2)
is a pair claw-free trapdoor permutations, then the FDH scheme instantiated with
F1 is secure against quantum adversaries.
Note that in this reduction, our simulated random oracle is truly random,
so we do not need to rely on Lemma 4.4. Hence, the tightness of the reduction
will be the same as the classical setting. Namely, if the quantum adversary A
has advantage ǫ when making qSIGN signature queries, B will have advantage
approximately ǫ/qSIGN.
The Katz-Wang Signature Scheme In this section, we consider a variant
of FDH due to Katz and Wang [KW03]. This scheme admits an almost tight
security reduction in the classical world. That is, if an adversary has advantage
ǫ, the reduction gives a claw finder with advantage ǫ/2. Their proof of security is
not in history-free form, but it can be modified so that it is in history-free form.
Given a pair of trapdoor permutation (F1,F2), the construction is as follows:
• G is the key generator for F .
• SO(sk,m) = f−11 (sk, O(b,m)) for a random bit b.
• V O(pk,m, σ) is 1 if either f1(pk, σ) = O(0,m) or f1(pk, σ) = O(1,m)
We construct a history-free reduction from an adversary A for S to an ad-
versary B for (F1,F2). The random oracle for this reduction, Oc(r), generates
a random pair (a, b), where a is a random element from the domain of F1 and
F2, and b is a random bit. On input pk, B works as follows:
• Compute START(pk, y) = (pk, pk), and simulate A on pk. Notice that z =
pk is the state saved by B.
• When A queries O(b, r), compute RANDOc(b, r, pk). For each string (b, r),
RAND works as follows: compute (a, b′) = Oc(r). If b = b
′, return f1(pk, a).
Otherwise, return f2(pk, a).
• When A queries S(sk,m), compute SIGNOc(m, pk). SIGN works as follows:
compute (a, b) = Oc(m) and return a.
• When A returns (m,σ), compute FINISHOc(m,σ, pk). FINISH works as
follows: compute (a, b) = Oc(m). If σ = a, abort. Otherwise, output (σ, a).
In addition, we have INSTANCE(pk) = pk and START(INSTANCE(pk)) =
(pk, pk), so INSTANCE and START satisfy the required properties.
Theorem 4.9. The reduction above is in history-free form.
Proof. RANDOc(b, r, pk) is completely random and independently distributed,
as f1(pk, a) and f2(pk, a) are both random (fb is a permutation and a is truly
random). Observe that f1(pk,SIGN
Oc(m, pk)) = f1(pk, a) = O(b,m) where
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(a, b) = Oc(m). Thus, signing queries are always answered with a valid signa-
ture, and the distribution of signatures is identical to that of the correct signing
algorithm since b is chosen uniformly.
Suppose A returns a valid forgery (m,σ). Let (a, b) = Oc(m). There are two
cases, corresponding to whether σ corresponds to a signature using b or 1 − b.
In the first case, we have f1(pk, σ) = O(b,m) = f1(pk, a), meaning σ = a, so
we abort. Otherwise, f1(pk, σ) = O(1 − b,m) = f2(pk, a), so (σ, a) form a claw.
Since the adversary never asked for a signing query on m, these two cases are
indistinguishable by the same logic as the proof for FDH. Thus, the probability
of failure is at most a half, which is non-negligible. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4.10. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, and (F1,F2)
is a pair claw-free trapdoor permutations, then the Katz-Wang signature scheme
instantiated with F1 is secure against quantum adversaries.
As in the case of FDH, our simulated quantum-accessible random oracle is
truly random, so we do not need to rely on Lemma 4.4. Thus, the tightness of
our reduction is the same as the classical case. In particular, if the quantum
adversary AQ has advantage ǫ then B will have advantage ǫ/2.
PSF Signatures from Claw-Free Permutations Gentry et al. [GPV08]
note that Claw-Free Permutations give rise to pre-image sampleable trapdoor
functions (PSFs). These PSFs can then be used to construct an FDH signature
scheme as in Section 4.1.
Given a pair of claw-free permutations (F1,F2), define the following PSF: G
is just the generator for the pair of permutations. Sample(pk) generates a random
bit b and random x in the domain of fb, and returns (x, b). f(pk, x, b) = fb(pk, x),
and f−1(sk, y) = (f−1b (sk, y), b) for a random b. Suppose we have a collision
((x1, b1), (x2, b2)) for this PSF. Then
fb1(pk, x1) = f(pk, x1, b1) = f(pk, x2, b2) = fb2(pk, x2)
If b1 = b2, then x1 = x2 since fb1 is a permutation. But this is impossible since
(x1, b1) 6= (x2, b2). Thus, b1 6= b2, so one of (x1, x2) or (x2, x1) is a claw for
(F1,F2).
Hence, we can instantiate FDH with this PSF to get the following signature
scheme:
• G is the generator for the permutations.
• SO(sk,m) = (f−1b (sk, O(m)), b) for a random bit b.
• V O(pk,m, (σ, b)) = 1 if and only if fb(pk, σ) = O(m).
The security of this scheme follows from Corollary 4.6, with a similar tightness
guarantee (this PSF has only a pre-image min-entropy of 1, which results in a
loss of a factor of two in the tightness of the reduction). In particular, if we have
a quantum adversary AQ for E with advantage ǫ, we get a quantum algorithm
BQ for the PSF with advantage ǫ/2, which gives us a quantum algorithm CQ
that finds claws of (F1,F2) with probability ǫ/2.
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5 Encryption Schemes in the Quantum-Accessible
Random Oracle Model
In this section, we prove the security of two encryption schemes. The first is the
BR encryption scheme due to Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], which we show is
CPA secure. The second is a hybrid generalization of the BR scheme, which we
show is CCA secure.
Ideally, we could define a general type of classical reduction like we did for
signatures, and show that such a reduction implies quantum security. Unfor-
tunately, defining a history-free reduction for encryption is considerably more
complicated than for signatures. We therefore directly prove the security of two
random oracle schemes in the quantum setting.
5.1 CPA Security of BR Encryption
In this section, we prove the security of the BR encryption scheme [BR93] against
quantum adversaries:
Definition 5.1 (BR Encryption Scheme). Let F = (G0, f, f−1) be an injec-
tive trapdoor function, and O a hash function with the same domain as f(pk, ·).
We define the following encryption scheme, E = (G,E,D) where:
• G = G0
• EO(pk,m) = (f(pk, r), O(r) ⊕m) for a randomly chosen r.
• DO(sk, (y, c)) = c⊕ f−1(sk, y)
A candidate quantum-immune injective trapdoor function can be built from hard
problems on lattices [PW08].
Theorem 5.2. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists and F is
a quantum-immune injective trapdoor function, then E is quantum CPA secure.
We omit the proof of Theorem 5.2 because the CPA security of the BR encryption
scheme is a special case of the CCA security of the hybrid encryption scheme in
the next section.
5.2 CCA Security of Hybrid Encryption
We now prove the CCA security of the following standard hybrid encryption,
a generalization of the BR encryption scheme scheme [BR93], built from an
injective trapdoor function and symmetric key encryption scheme.
Definition 5.3 (Hybrid Encryption Scheme). Let F = (G0, f, f−1) be an
injective trapdoor function, and ES = (ES , DS) be a CCA secure symmetric key
encryption scheme, and O a hash function. We define the following encryption
scheme, E = (G,E,D) where:
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• G = G0
• EO(pk,m) = (f(pk, r), ES(O(r),m)) for a randomly chosen r.
• DO(sk, (y, c)) = DS(O(r′), c) where r′ = f−1(sk, y)
We note that the BR encryption scheme from the previous section is a special
case of this hybrid encryption scheme where ES is the one-time pad. That is,
ES(k,m) = k ⊕m and DS(k, c) = k ⊕ c.
Theorem 5.4. If quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exists, F is a
quantum-immune injective trapdoor function, and ES is a quantum CCA secure
symmetric key encryption scheme, then E is quantum CCA secure.
Proof. Suppose we have an adversary AQ that breaks E . We start with the
standard security game for CCA secure encryption:
Game 0. Define Game0 as the game a quantum adversary AQ plays for problem
Asym-CCA(E).
Game 1.Define Game1 as the following game: the challenger generates (sk, pk)←
G(1n), a random r in the domain of F , a random k in the key space of ES , and
computes y = f(pk, r). The challenger has access to a quantum-accessible ran-
dom oracle Oq whose range is the key space of ES . It then sends pk to AQ. The
challenger answers queries as follows:
• Random oracle queries are answered with the random oracle Oquant, which
takes a basis element |x, y〉 into |x, y ⊕Oq(f(pk, x))〉.
• Decryption queries on (y′, c′) are answered as follows:
Case 1: If y = y′, respond with DS(k, c
′).
Case 2: If y 6= y′, respond with DS(Oq(y′), c′).
• The challenge query on (m0,m1) is answered as follows: choose a random
b. Then, respond with (y, ES(k,mb)).
When AQ responds with b
′, we say that AQ won if b = b
′.
Observe that, because f is injective and Oq is random, the oracle Oquant is a
truly random oracle with the same range as Oq. The challenge ciphertext (y, c)
seen by AQ is distributed identically to that of Game0. Further, it is a valid
encryption of mb relative to the random oracle being Oquant if Oq(y) = k. For
y′ 6= y, the decryption of (y′, c′) is
DS(Oq(y
′), c′) = DS(Oquant(f
−1(sk, y′)), c′) = DOquant(sk, (y′, c′))
Which is correct. Likewise, if Oq(y) = k, the decryption of (y, c
′) is also correct.
Thus, the view of AQ in Game1 is identical to that in Game0 if Oq(y) = k. We
now make the following observations:
• The challenge query and decryption query answering algorithms never query
Oq on y.
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• Each quantum random oracle query from the adversary to Oquant leads
to a quantum random oracle query from the challenger to Oq. The query
magnitude of y in the challenger’s query to Oq is the same as the query
magnitude of r in the adversary’s query Oquant.
Let ǫ be the sum of the square magnitudes of y over all queries made to Oq (i.e.
the total query probability of y). This is identical to the total query probability
of r over all queries AQ makes to Oquant.
We now construct a quantum algorithm B
Oq
F that uses a quantum-accessible
random oracle Oq, and inverts f with probability ǫ/q, where q is the number of
random oracle queries made by AQ. B
Oq
F takes as input (pk, y), and its goal is
to output r = f−1(sk, y). B
Oq
F works as follows:
• Generate a random k in the key space of ES . Also, generate a random
i ∈ {1, ..., q}. Now, send pk to AQ and play the role of challenger to AQ.
• Answer random oracle queries with the random oracle Oquant, which takes
a basis element |x, y〉 into |x, y ⊕Oq(f(pk, x))〉.
• Answer decryption queries on (y′, c′) as follows:
Case 1: If y = y′, respond with DS(k, c
′).
Case 2: If y 6= y′, respond with DS(Oq(y′), c′).
• Answer the challenge query on (m0,m1) as follows: choose a random b.
Then, respond with (y, ES(k,mb)).
• At the ith random oracle query, sample the query to get r′, and output r′
and terminate.
Comparing our definition of B
Oq
F to Game1, we can conclude that the view seen
by AQ in both cases is identical. Thus, the total query probability that AQ makes
to Oquant at the point r is ǫ. Hence, the probability that B
Oq
F outputs r is ǫ/q.
If we assume that F is secure against quantum adversaries that use a quantum-
accessible random oracle, then this quantity, and hence ǫ, must be negligible. As
in the case of signatures (Section 4), we can replace this assumption with the
assumption that F is secure against quantum adversaries (i.e. with no access to
a quantum random oracle) and that pseudorandom functions exists to reach the
same conclusion.
Since ǫ is negligible, we can change Oq(y) = k in Game1, thus getting a game
identical to Game0 from the adversary’s point of view. Notice that in Game0
and Game1, AQ is in a pure state because we are only applying unitary transfor-
mations, performing measurements, or performing classical communication. We
are only changing the oracle at a point with negligible total query probability,
so Lemma 2.2 tells us that making this change only affects the distribution of
the outcome of Game1 negligibly. This allows us to conclude that the success
probability of AQ in Game1 is negligibly close to that in Game0.
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Now, assume that the success probability of AQ in Game1 is non-negligible.
We now define a quantum algorithmB
Oq
ES
that uses a quantum-accessible random
oracle Oq to break the CCA security of ES . BOqES works as follows:
• On input 1n, generate (sk, pk) ← G(1n). Also, generate a random r, and
compute y = f(pk, r). Now send pk to AQ and play the role of challenger to
AQ.
• Answer random oracle queries with the random oracle Oquant, which takes
a basis element |x, y〉 into |x, y ⊕Oq(f(pk, x))〉.
• Answer decryption queries on (y′, c′) as follows:
Case 1: If y = y′, ask the ES challenger for a decryption DS(k, c′) to obtain
m′. Return m′ to AQ.
Case 2: If y 6= y′, respond with DS(Oq(y′), c′).
• Answer the challenge query on (m0,m1) by forwarding the pair ES . When
the challenger responds with c (which equals ES(k,mb) for some b), return
(y, c) to AQ.
• When AQ outputs b′, output b′ and halt.
Comparing our definition of B
Oq
ES
to that of Game1, we can conclude that the
view of AQ in both cases is identical. Thus, AQ succeeds with non-negligible
probability. If AQ succeeds, it means it returned b, meaning B
Oq
ES
also succeeded.
Thus, we have an algorithm with a quantum random oracle that breaks ES .
This is a contradiction if ES is CCA secure against quantum adversaries with
access to a quantum random oracle, which holds since ES is CCA secure against
quantum adversaries and quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist, by
assumption.
Thus, the success probability of AQ in Game1 is negligible, so the success
probability of AQ in Game0 is also negligible. Hence, we have shown that all
polynomial time quantum adversaries have negligible advantage in breaking in
breaking the CCA security of E , so E is CCA secure. ⊓⊔
We briefly explain why Theorem 5.2 is a special case of Theorem 5.4. Notice
that, in the above proof, BES only queries its decryption oracle when answering
decryption queries made by AQ, and that it never makes encryption queries.
Hence, if AQ makes no decryption queries, BES makes no queries at all except
the challenge query. If we are only concerned with the CPA security of E , we
then only need ES to be secure against adversaries that can only make the
challenge query. Further, if we only let AQ make a challenge query with messages
of length n, then ES only has to be secure against adversaries making challenges
of a specific length. But this is exactly the model in which the one-time pad is
unconditionally secure. Hence, the BR encryption scheme is secure, and we have
proved Theorem 5.2.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that great care must be taken if using the random oracle model
when arguing security against quantum attackers. Proofs in the classical case
should be reconsidered, especially in case the quantum adversary can access the
random oracle with quantum states. We also developed conditions for translating
security proofs in the classical random oracle model to the quantum random
oracle model. We applied these tools to certain signature and encryption schemes.
The foremost question raised by our results is in how far techniques for
“classical random oracles” can be applied in the quantum case. This stems from
the fact that manipulating or even observing the interaction with the quantum-
accessible random oracle would require measurements of the quantum states.
That, however, prevents further processing of the query in a quantum manner.
We gave several examples of schemes that remain secure in the quantum setting,
provided quantum-accessible pseudorandom functions exist. The latter primitive
seems to be fundamental to simulate random oracles in the quantum world.
Showing or disproving the existence of such pseudorandom functions is thus an
important step.
Many classical random oracle results remain open in the quantum random
oracle settings. It is not known how to prove security of generic FDH signatures
as well as signatures derived from the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the quantum
random oracle model. Similarly, a secure generic transformation from CPA to
CCA security in the quantum RO model is still open.
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A Definitions
Definition A.1 (Trapdoor Permutation). A trapdoor permutation is a triple
of functions F = (G, f, f−1) where:
• G(1n) generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk).
• f(pk, ·) is a permutation for all pk.
• f−1(sk, ·) is the inverse of f(pk, ·) for all (pk, sk) generated by G. That is,
f−1(sk, f(pk, x)) = x and f(pk, f−1(sk, y)) = y.
For a trapdoor permutation F , we define the problem Inv(F) = (Game(F), 0)
where Game(F) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the
challenger Ch: Ch, on input n, runs G(1n) to obtain (sk, pk) and generates a
random y in the range of f(pk, ·). It sends (pk, y) to A. A is allowed to make
quantum random oracle queries O(·). When A outputs x, Ch outputs 1 if and
only if f(pk, x) = y.
Definition A.2. A trapdoor permutation F is secure against quantum adver-
saries if Inv(F) is hard for quantum computers.
The following definition is due to [GPV08]:
Definition A.3 (Preimage Sampleable Trapdoor Function). A quadru-
ple of functions F = (G,Sample, f, f−1) is a trapdoor collision-resistant hash
function with preimage sampling (PSF) if:
• G(1n) generates secret and public keys (sk, pk).
• f(pk, ·) has domain D and range R.
• Sample(1n) samples from a distribution on D such that for all pk the dis-
tribution f
(
pk, Sample(1n)
)
is within ǫsample of uniform.
• f−1(sk, y) generates an x such that f(pk, x) = y. The distribution is within
ǫpre of the conditional distribution of Sample() given f(pk, x) = y, where
ǫpre is negligible.
• Pre-image Min-entropy: For all y ∈ R, the probability of any element in the
conditional distribution of Sample(1n) given f(pk, x) = y is less than ǫprob,
where ǫprob is negligible.
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For a PSF, we define two problems: Inv(F) is identical to the problem with
the same name for trapdoor permutations, and Col(F) = (Game(F), 0) where
Game(F) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the chal-
lenger Ch: Ch, on input n, runs G(1n) to obtain (sk, pk), and sends pk to A. A
is allowed to make quantum random oracle queries O(·). When A outputs a pair
(x1, x2), Ch outputs 1 if and only if both x1 6= x2 and f(pk, x1) = f(pk, x2).
Definition A.4. A PSF F is secure against quantum adversaries if Inv(F) and
Col(F) are both hard for quantum computers.
[GPV08] construct a PSF whose security is based on the hardness of lattice
problems.
Signature schemes. We next review signature schemes using our unified notation.
Definition A.5 (Signature Scheme). A random oracle signature scheme is
a triple of functions S = (G,SO, V O) where:
• O is a random oracle.
• G(1n) generates a pair (sk, pk) where sk is the signer’s private key, and pk
is the public key.
• SO(sk,m) generates a signature σ.
• V O(pk,m, σ) returns 1 if and only if σ is a valid signature on m.
We require that V O(pk,m, SO(sk,m)) = 1 for all m and (sk, pk) generated
by G.
For a signature scheme S, we define the problem Sig−Forge(S) = (Game(S), 0)
where Game(S) is the following game between a quantum adversary A and the
challenger ChO: ChO, on input n, runs G(1n) to obtain (sk, pk). It then sends
pk to A. A is allowed to make quantum random oracle queries O(·) and classical
signature queries SO(sk, ·) to ChO. When A outputs a forgery candidate (m,σ),
ChO outputs 1 if and only if A never asked for a signature on m and σ is a valid
signature for m (V O(pk,m, σ) = 1).
Definition A.6. A signature scheme S is secure against quantum adversaries
if Sig − Forge(S) is hard for quantum computers.
Encryption. We next review encryption systems using our notation.
Definition A.7 (Symmetric Key Encryption Scheme). A symmetric key
random oracle encryption scheme is a pair of functions E = (EO, DO) where:
• EO(k,m) generates a ciphertext c.
• DO(k, c) computes the plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext c. We require
that DO(k,EO(k,m)) = m.
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For a symmetric key encryption scheme E , we define the problem Sym−CCA(E) =
(Game(E), 12 ) where Game(E) is the following game between a quantum adver-
sary A and the challenger ChO: ChO, on input n, generates a key k of length
n at random, and sends k to A. A is allowed to make quantum random ora-
cle queries O(·), classical encryption queries EO(k, ·), and classical decryption
queries DO(k, ·). A is also allowed one classical challenge query, where it sends
ChO a pair (m0,m1). Ch
O chooses a random bit b, and computes c = EO(k,mb),
which it sends to A. When A returns a bit b′, ChO outputs 1 if and only if both
b = b′ and there was no decryption query DO(k, c) after the challenge query.
Definition A.8 (Symmetric Key CCA Security). A symmetric key en-
cryption scheme E is Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) secure against quantum
adversaries if Sym− CCA(E) is hard for quantum computers.
Definition A.9 (Asymmetric Key Encryption Scheme). An Asymmetric
key encryption scheme is a triple of functions E = (G,EO, DO) where:
• G(1n) generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk)
• EO(pk,m) generates a ciphertext c.
• DO(sk, c) computes the plaintext m corresponding to ciphertext c. We re-
quire that DO(sk, EO(pk,m)) = m.
For a symmetric key encryption scheme E , we define the problem Asym −
CCA(E) = (Game(E), 12 ) where Game(E) is the following game between a quan-
tum adversary A and the challenger ChO: ChO, on input n, uses G(1n) to gen-
erate (sk, pk), and sends pk to A. A is allowed to make quantum random oracle
queries O(·) and classical decryption queries DO(sk, ·). A if also allowed to make
one classical challenge query, where it sends ChO a pair (m0,m1). Ch
O chooses
a random bit b, and computes c = EO(pk,mb), which it sends to A. When A
returns a bit b′, ChO outputs 1 if and only if both b = b′ and there was no
decryption query DO(sk, c) after the challenge query.
Definition A.10 (Asymmetric Key CCA Security). An Asymmetric key
encryption scheme E is Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) secure against quantum
adversaries if Asym− CCA(E) is hard for quantum computers.
B Security of the IS∗ Protocol
To prove security of our protocol we need to show that an adversary A after
interacting with an honest prover P∗, can subsequently not impersonate P∗
such that V∗ accepts the identification.
Security against Classical Adversaries. We first show that the IS∗ protocol is
secure in the (standard) random oracle model against classical adversaries and
then discuss that there exist hash functions, which can securely replace the
random oracle.
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Lemma B.1. Let IS = (IS.KGen,P ,V) be a secure identification scheme. Then
for any efficient classical adversary A and ℓ > 6 log(α) the protocol IS∗ is secure
in the random oracle.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that a verifier V∗ after interacting with
an adversary A, both given (pk, ℓ) as input, accepts with output b∗ = 1. Thus,
A must have convinced V∗ in the evaluation of the IS-protocol or provided at
least r/4 collisions. Due to the independence of the two stages of our protocol
(in particular, sk is not used during the collision search) we have
Pr[A “breaks” IS∗] ≤ Pr[collCount > r/4] + Pr[A “breaks” IS].
Since we assume that the underlying identification scheme is secure, the latter
probability is negligible. Thus, it remains to show that an adversary A with
access to a random oracle H finds r/4 near-collisions on H(ki, ·) for given ki
in time O(
3
√
2ℓ) with negligible probability only. In the random oracle model,
the ability of finding collisions is bounded by the birthday attack, which states
that after sending
√
2ℓ random input values5, at least one pair will collide with
probability ≥ 1/2. Taking possible parallel power of the adversary into account,
the protocol allows A to make at most α · 3
√
2ℓ queries for some constant α ≥ 1
(Assumption 1). Since ℓ > 6 log(α) we have α · 3
√
2ℓ <
√
2ℓ and thus A’s success
probability for finding a collision in each round is < 1/2 which vanishes when
repeating the collision search r times.
More concretely, the upper bound on the birthday probability for q queries
and a function with range size N is given by q(q−1)2N (see e.g. [BKR94]). Thus,
when considering an adversary making at most q = α
3
√
2ℓ queries to a random
oracle with range {0, 1}ℓ we obtain:
Pr[Coll] ≤ α
2
2
3
√
2ℓ
≤ α
2
2 3
√
n
due to the choice of ℓ ≤ logn. The repetition of such a constrained collision search
does not increase the success probability of the adversary, since the verifier sends
a fresh “key” ki in each round. Thus, the adversary cannot reuse already learned
values from the random oracle, but has to start the collision search from scratch
for each new key. That is, the probability of A finding a collision is at most
Pr[Coll] in each round.
Applying the Chernoff-bound yields the probability for finding at least r/4
collision in r independent rounds:
Pr[collCount > r/4] ≤ exp
(
− rα
2
2 3
√
n
·
(
3
√
n− 2α2
2α2
)2
· 1
4
)
≤ exp
(
− r
3
√
n
32α2
)
5 Note that we give all statements for a random oracle outputting directly ℓ ≤ log(n)
bits, as we are interested in near-collisions. Such an oracle can be obtained from a
random oracle with range {0, 1}n by simply truncating the output to the first ℓ bits.
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Thus, for a constant α, and setting r = poly(n) the above term is negligible
in n. However, then, the overall success probability of A is negligible as well.
When considering classical adversaries only, we can securely instantiate the
random oracle in the IS∗ scheme by a hash function H that provides near-
collision-resistance close to the birthday bound. Under this assumption, the secu-
rity proof of our identification scheme carries over to the standard model, as well.
(We omit a formal proof, as it follows the argumentation of Lemma B.1 closely.)
Note that it is a particular requirement of the SHA-3 competition [NIS07], that
the hash function candidates achieve collision-resistance approximately up to
the birthday bound and provide this property also for any fixed subset of the
hash functions’ output bits. Thus, all remaining SHA-3 candidates (or at least
the winner of the competition) is supposed to be quasi-optimal near-collision-
resistant.
Security against Quantum Adversaries. We now show that such a result is im-
possible in the quantum world, i.e., for any hash function H there exists a
quantum-adversary AQ that breaks the IS∗ protocol (regardless of the secu-
rity of the underlying identification scheme). This contrasts with the security
that can still be achieved in the (classical) random oracle model:
Lemma B.2. Let ISQ = (IS.KGen,P ,V) be a secure quantum-immune identifi-
cation scheme. Then for any efficient quantum adversary AQ and ℓ > 6 log(α)
the protocol IS∗ is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. By assuming that ISQ is a quantum-immune identification scheme, an
adversary AQ trying to convince a verifier V∗ in the IS∗ protocol must provide
at least r/4 many collisions in the first stage of the protocol. Thus, we have
to show that a quantum adversary AQ can succeed in the collision-search with
negligible probability only.
Note that in order to gain advantage of the quantum speed-up (e.g., by apply-
ing Grover’s search algorithm) the random oracle H , resp. the indicator function
based on H , has to be evaluated on quantum states, i.e., on superpositions of
many input strings. However, by granting AQ only classical access to the random
oracle, it is not able to exploit its additional quantum power to find collisions
on H . Thus, AQ has to stick to the classical collision-search on a random oracle,
which we have proven to succeed in r/4 of r rounds with negligible probability,
due to the constraint of making at most α · 3
√
2ℓ oracle queries per round (see
proof of Lemma B.1 for details).
We now show that our IS∗ scheme becomes totally insecure for any instan-
tiation of the random oracle by a hash function H.
Lemma B.3. There exist an efficient quantum adversary AQ such that for any
hash function H = (H.KGen,H.Eval) the protocol IS∗ is insecure.
Proof. For the proof, we show that a quantum-adversary AQ can find collisions
on H in at least r/4 rounds with non-negligible probability. To this end, we
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first transform the classical hash function H into a quantum-accessible function
HQ. For the transformation, we use the fact that any classical computation can
be done on a quantum computer as well [NC00]. The ability to evaluate HQ
on superpositions then allows to apply Grover’s algorithm in a straightforward
manner: for any key ki that is sent by the verifier V∗, the adversary invokes
Grover’s search on an indicator function testing whether HQ.Eval(ki, x)|ℓ =
HQ.Eval(ki, x
′)|ℓ for distinct x 6= x′ holds. After 3
√
2ℓ evaluations of HQ the
algorithm outputs a collisionMi,M
′
i with probability > 1/2. As we assume that
a quantum evaluation of HQ requires roughly the same time than an evaluation
of the corresponding classical function H, and we do not charge AQ for any other
computation, the collision search of AQ terminates before V∗ stops a round of
the collision-finding stage.
Hence, AQ provides a collision with probability> 1/2 in each of the r rounds.
Using the Chernoff bound, we can now upper bound the probability that AQ
finds less than r/4 collision as:
Pr[collCount < r/4] ≤ exp
(
− r
2
·
(
1
2
)2
· 1
2
)
≤ exp
(
− r
16
)
which is roughly Pr[collCount < r/4] ≤ 0.94r and thus negligible as a function of
r. That is, the adversary AQ can make V∗ accept the interaction with noticeable
probability at least 1− Pr[collCount < r/4].
As Grover’s algorithm only requires (quantum-accessible) black-box access
to the hash function, the approach described in the proof of Lemma B.3 directly
applies to the quantum-accessible random oracle model, as well:
Lemma B.4. The protocol IS∗ is not secure in the quantum-accessible random
oracle model.
C Proof of Lemma 4.4
Before we prove Lemma 4.4, we need to prove the following two technical lemmas:
Lemma C.1. Let |φ〉 and |φ′〉 be superpositions with |φ−φ′| ≤ γ. Let P be some
property on strings. Suppose measuring |φ〉 gives a string that satisfies P with
probability ǫ. Then measuring |φ′〉 gives a string that satisfies P with probability
ǫ′ where √
ǫ − γ ≤
√
ǫ′ ≤ √ǫ+ γ
Proof. We will prove this lemma geometrically. We can think of a state |φ〉 as
a vector φ in Cn. Then the basis elements |x〉 as elements of the standard basis
for Cn. We are given that |φ − φ′| ≤ γ, meaning that φ and φ′ have Euclidean
distance of at most γ.
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For a bit string x, the probability that sampling |φ〉 results in x is |〈x,φ〉|2.
Let SP be the set of basis elements x such that x satisfied P . The probability
that sampling |φ〉 results in a string satisfying P is then given by∑
x∈SP
|〈x,φ〉|2
This also is the square of the length of the projection of φ onto the subspace
spanned by SP . So, let φP and φ
′
P
be the projections of φ and φ′ onto the space
spanned by SP . The probability that sampling |φ〉 (resp. |φ′〉) results in a string
satisfying P is simply ǫ = |φP |2 (resp. ǫ′ =
∣∣φ′
P
∣∣2). Projections only decrease
distance, so by the triangle inequality,
√
ǫ′ =
∣∣φ′
P
∣∣ ≤ |φP |+ ∣∣φP − φ′P ∣∣ ≤ |φP |+ |φ− φ′| ≤ √ǫ+ γ
Reversing the roles of |φ〉 and |φ′〉 gives us the other inequality.
Lemma C.2. Let A be an quantum algorithm that makes at most q queries to
quantum random oracle O. Fix a y in the co-domain of O. The expected value
of the total query probability of all x such that O(x) = y is at most 2q
3
2m .
Proof. Suppose we have an oracle O′ for which the output on every input
is distributed identically and independently, with a uniform distribution over
{0, 1}m \ {y}. We now modify the oracle as follows: for each input x, with prob-
ability 2−m, replace the output with y. This oracle is now a random oracle, so
its distribution is identical to O.
Let σi be the total query magnitude over the first i − 1 queries of x such
that we change O′(x). Let δi be the query magnitude of those x in the ith query.
Let γi be the Euclidean distance between the state of A at the ith query when
using oracle O′ and the modified oracle O. By (2.2), γi ≤
√
(i− 1)σi. Let ρi be
the query magnitude of x such that O(x) = y (which is the same as the query
probability of x such that we changed O′(x)). By the above lemma,
ρi ≤ (
√
δi + γi)
2
= δi + γ
2
i + 2
√
δγi
≤ δi + (i − 1)σi + 2
√
(i− 1)δiσi
≤ δi + (i − 1)σi + 2
√
i− 1(δi + σi)
Now, observe that since we are deciding whether to change the output of a
query point at random and independently, the expected query probability of the
points that we changed in each query is exactly 2−m. Thus, E [δi] = 2
−m and
E [σi] = (i− 1)2−m. Thus,
E [ρi] ≤ 2−m(1 + (i − 1)2 + 2
√
i− 1(1 + (i− 1))) ≤ 2−m2i2
. This result is not surprising, as it implies that any quantum algorithm which is
to output a preimage of y with overwhelming probability must make O(
√
2−m)
quantum oracle queries, which is well known lower bound for the unstructured
search problem (see Bennett et al. [BBBV97] for more). Summing over all q
queries gives the expected query probability of x such that O(x) = y to be at
most 2× 2−mq3.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We are given a random oracle O and a distribution D
that is ǫ-close to uniform. Observe that:
ǫ =
∑
y
∣∣Pr[y|D]− 2−m∣∣
=
∑
y:Pr[y|D]≥2−m
(
Pr[y|D]− 2−m)+ ∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(
2−m − Pr[y|D])
0 =
∑
y:Pr[y|D]≥2−m
(
Pr[y|D]− 2−m)− ∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(
2−m − Pr[y|D])
Thus,
ǫ
2
=
∑
y:Pr[y|D]≥2−m
(
Pr[y|D]− 2−m) = ∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(
2−m − Pr[y|D])
Define a distribution D′ as follows:
• If Pr[y|D] < 2−m, Pr[y|D′] = 0.
• If Pr[y|D] ≥ 2−m, Pr[y|D′] = (Pr[y|D]− 2−m)2/ǫ
All the probabilities are clearly non-negative. For this to be a probability distri-
bution, the probabilities need to um to 1:
∑
y
Pr[y|D′] =
∑
y:Pr[y|D]≥2−m
(Pr[y|D]− 2−m)2
ǫ
=
ǫ
2
2
ǫ
= 1
Now, we can create another distribution D′′ as follows: first, generate y uni-
formly at random. Then,
• If Pr[y|D] ≥ 2−m, output y.
• If Pr[y|D] < 2−m, then with probability 2m Pr[y|D], output y. Otherwise,
pick a y′ from D′ and output y′.
If Pr[y|D] < 2−m, Pr[y|D′′] = 2−m × (2m Pr[y|D]) = Pr[y|D]. Otherwise,
Pr[y|D′′] = 2−m +
∑
y′:Pr[y′|D]<2−m
2−m(1− 2m Pr[y′|D]) Pr[y|D′] (C.1)
= 2−m +
∑
y′:Pr[y′|D]<2−m
(2−m − Pr[y′|D])(Pr[y|D]− 2−m)2
ǫ
(C.2)
= 2−m +
ǫ
2
(Pr[y|D]− 2−m)2
ǫ
= Pr[y|D] (C.3)
37
Thus D′′ = D. This demonstrates that we can construct the oracle O′ whose
elements are distributed according to D as follows: Start with the random or-
acle O, and for each input x, if Pr[O(x)|D] < 2−m, then with probability
1 − 2m Pr[O(x)|D], replace the output with a y′ drawn from D′X . Otherwise
leave the oracle unchanged at that point.
Now we bound the expected query magnitude of x such that the oracle
changed. By the above lemma, the expected total query probability of any x
such that O(x) = y is 2q32−m. Let σ be the query magnitude of points x at
which we changed the oracle:
E[σ] = E

 ∑
x:Pr[O(x)|D]<2−m
(1− 2−m Pr[O(x)|D]) × (total query magnitude of x)


=
∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(1 − 2m Pr[y|D])E[total query magnitude of x such that O(x) = y]
≤
∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(1 − 2m Pr[y|D])2q32−m
= 2q3
∑
y:Pr[y|D]<2−m
(2−m − Pr[y|D]) = 2q
3ǫ
2
= q3ǫ
Thus the expected Euclidean distance is
E[
√
qσ] ≤
√
q E[σ] ≤
√
q × q3ǫ = q2√ǫ
This means the expected variational distance of the output distributions is at
most 4q2
√
ǫ. Thus, the distribution of outputs when the oracle values are dis-
tributed according to D is at most 4q2
√
ǫ away from the distribution of outputs
when the oracle is truly random. ⊓⊔
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